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Neoliberal Citizenship and the Politics 
of Corruption 





In contemporary neoliberal perspectives, corruption is essentially 
framed in terms of the opposition between the state, political elites 
and public employees on the one hand, and civil society, the market 
and consumer-citizens on the other. Public services are by default 
constructed as breeding grounds for corruption, while honest 
(middle-class) citizens are seen as opposing corruption by 
demanding the rule of law, private property and market behaviour 
(Stan 2012). In this view, anti-corruption campaigns are the crusade of 
civil society against parasitic, non-market clientelistic relations 
(Sampson 2005). The solution to corruption is, therefore, to redraw 
the boundary between state and market, and public and private 
sectors, by extending the first and reducing the second. 
This view acknowledges that corruption is a battleground of 
social struggles. Anthropological studies of corruption have, 
however, proposed that the manner in which this happens may in 
reality be more complicated than that. The most notable such 
studies have come from a renewed interest in political anthropology 
among those studying post-socialist and post-colonial societies, and 
calling for an anthropology of the state (Verdery 1996; Gupta 2012). 
Akhil Gupta in particular argues that the degree to which discourses 
of corruption and accountability become politically significant 
depends not only on pressures from global organizations such as 
the World Bank or Transparency International, but also on the 
degree to which groups affected by corruption organize themselves 
at national, regional and local levels. For example, in the case of the 
‘routinized practices of retail corruption’ in India, Gupta (2012: 99, 
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100) finds that urban, middle-class political activism at a national 
level and agrarian mobilization at a regional level were important for 
making anti-corruption and clean government an important political 
issue. Most interestingly, Gupta also finds that these groups 
demanded an end to corruption in the name of the inclusive 
citizenship put forward by India’s populist democracy. In this case, 
therefore, struggles around corruption were not so much about 
retrenching the realm of the state as about extending it, most notably 
by extending access to the public goods and services distributed by 
the state (i.e. citizenship). In a similar vein, we could read 
Schneider and Schneider’s (2005) analysis of mafia practices in 
Italy as illustrating another possible use of corruption in struggles 
around citizenship. In this case, ruling elites encouraged corruption 
in order to maintain their dominance, most notably by stifling 
labour protest intended to bring about a more inclusive definition of 
citizenship. In contrast to neoliberal views on corruption, these 
studies show that corruption and demands to end it may be 
pursued by a variety of actors using a variety of means. 
The link between struggles around corruption and citizenship is 
important. Indeed, it draws our attention to the state as being not 
only and automatically a breeding ground for corruption (as in 
neoliberal perspectives) but also an arena of social struggle over the 
distribution of common goods (Bourdieu, Waquant and Farage 
1994), which constitute both the substance of citizenship and the 
object of corrupt practices. Struggles around corruption, including 
around identifying its nature, location and culprits, may thus take 
several possible forms, which need to be studied empirically rather 
than assumed. 
This chapter uses informal exchanges (or ‘petty corruption’) in the 
Romanian healthcare sector to investigate the links between 
corruption and neoliberal citizenship regimes, and to illustrate its 
contested character in post-socialist contexts. Given its role in the 
social reproduction of capitalist societies (Navarro 1976), and given 
that access to it has traditionally been seen as an important 
citizenship entitlement in Europe, healthcare offers a useful vantage 
point for grasping struggles over citizenship in the region. 
In recent decades, reforms across Europe have aimed to commodify 
healthcare, and so challenge entitlement to healthcare services and 
reconfigure citizenship. I want to situate informal exchanges in 
Romanian healthcare in the larger context of that rise of neoliberal 
citizenship and healthcare reform, which has been attended by 
increasingly unequal access to services, by worsening employment 
conditions in the sector and by protest against those reforms among 
the public and those in the sector. 
  
Neoliberal Citizenship ◆ 3 
 
I treat neoliberalism as a set of policies that seek to encourage the 
development of the ‘free market’ by reducing state involvement in 
various parts of the economy and the society. In public services 
such as healthcare, these policies include measures such as cuts in 
public spending, the introduction of new public management and 
the privatization of service delivery, management and funding. By 
using the term ‘neoliberal’ I do not assume that all policies come as 
a coherent package to be adopted in one go. Rather, I contend that, 
while they have often been adopted and implemented in a patchy and 
uneven manner, these policies have also contributed in various ways 
to extending the realm of the market in health services. Finally, this 
chapter does not argue that informal exchanges are a novelty 
generated by neoliberal policies. Rather, it contends that their form 
and the way various actors in society engage with these exchanges 
are embedded in the larger policy frame of particular historical 
periods. A period dominated by neoliberal policies is one of them, 
and the chapter seeks to unearth what is specific about informal 
exchanges and corruption at this time. 
In order to do this, I adopt a historical perspective that links 
citizenship configurations to the changing nature of informal 
exchanges since the fall of the Communist regime at the end of the 
1980s. The chapter starts by describing the configuration of 
citizenship and informal relations during the socialist period and 
then looks at the dismantling of the socialist worker-citizenship 
and at the new role played by informal exchanges during the 1990s. 
It then links the rise of neoliberal citizenship during the economic 
boom (2000–08) with the increasingly divergent nature of informal 
exchanges, attending particularly to how they help to reproduce 
or, alternatively, temper inequalities of access to services. The 
chapter then turns to the austerity period that followed the boom, 
and shows that the consolidation of neoliberal citizenship and the 
accelerated privatizing of healthcare have led to informal 
exchanges taking forms that are intimately imbricated with the 
public–private mixes to which these reforms have given rise. It also 
shows that the intensification of union and popular protest against 
these reforms has triggered increased government attempts to 
identify informal exchanges as corruption, and to use them to 
justify further privatization of healthcare. 
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Worker-Citizenship, the Economy of Favours and 
Informal Exchanges during Socialism 
During the socialist period, the regime’s worker-citizenship was built 
around access to and security of employment, and also included free 
and universal access to healthcare and education, as well as access to 
a variety of subsidized services such as rented accommodation and 
holidays in socialist resorts (Kideckel 2001). However, Romania’s 
focus on developing heavy industry and the resultant low levels of 
healthcare expenditure led to access to healthcare being informed by 
various inequalities, such as that between urban and rural areas and 
between workers in different sectors of the economy. 
Informal exchanges between patients and healthcare personnel 
played an important role in moderating these inequalities. Together 
with informal exchanges in other areas, these were part of the larger 
socialist ‘economy of favours’ (Ledeneva 2014). Based on networks 
of personal relations and exchanges of favours among family, friends, 
neighbours and work colleagues, the economy of favours helped to 
compensate for the occasional bottlenecks in the distribution of goods 
in the socialist economy (Sampson 1983, 1986). Moreover, because 
favours involved the creative use of whatever resources and services 
various employees controlled in their workplaces, the economy of 
favours also had a relatively equalizing effect on access to goods and 
services, thereby ‘reducing the privilege gap between insiders and 
outsiders of the centralised distribution system’ (Ledeneva 2014: 16). 
Although it involved the appropriation of public goods, the 
socialist economy of favours differs in important ways from forms of 
corruption in capitalist societies. This is because ‘the nature of formal 
constraints’ (Ledeneva 2014: 17) framing the socialist and capitalist 
societies are different. In socialist societies ‘the lack of private 
property or clear divisions between the public and the private’ 
provided citizens with ‘a degree of entitlement to whatever the 
economy of favours had to offer’ (ibid.). Accordingly, during 
socialism many citizens construed favours as the ‘selfless 
redistribution of public funds for a moral cause’ (i.e. as access to 
goods and services to which one was already entitled), thus 
distancing many ordinary exchanges of favours in which they were 
involved from self-serving corrupt practices (ibid.). 
Moreover, during socialism, wrongdoing was not understood in 
the same way as capitalist corruption, with reference to the expected 
behaviour of a particular sector of the society (i.e. public servants 
Neoliberal Citizenship ◆ 5 
 
misusing public resources for private gain). In addition, it was 
understood with reference to the expected entitlements of worker-
citizens (i.e. their misuse of collective resources for personal gain 
beyond what they were normally entitled to through their 
employment). This meant that, given that all socialist enterprises 
were part of the collective good, the potential realm of economic 
wrongdoing was extended beyond public servants to include all 
employees. 
The Communist regime came, therefore, to be caught between, 
on the one hand, its embedding of socialist worker-citizenship in 
entitlement to a package of goods and services and, on the other, 
its inability to ensure that everyone had access to this package. As a 
result, recourse to informal exchanges ‘was prosecuted by 
authorities in only selective campaigns’ (Ledeneva 2014: 16). 
Interestingly, a 1978 report found that most cases prosecuted 
through the law on illicit gains concerned ordinary workers, with 
cadres constituting only 1.3 per cent of total cases (Evenimentul zilei 
2008). The regime, therefore, not only allowed the economy of 
favours to compensate for the deficiencies in resource allocation, but 
also used the potential threat of prosecution as a means to discipline 
various sections of its population – most notably the potentially 
contentious working class, and not so much the cadres. 
Doctors were well placed to attract a relatively large share of 
resources exchanged informally, as they could dispense services vital 
to all citizens. Some doctors, especially those involved in what was 
seen as more critical hospital care, were much better placed than 
ordinary workers to informally appropriate goods that they could 
later give to others as favours or sell on the black market. Especially 
in urban areas, some doctors managed to live in large villas and have a 
prestigiously higher standard of living than ordinary workers, despite 
their salaries not being markedly higher than those of the workers. 
Thus, during socialism the medical profession faced a continuous 
underfunding of healthcare services and the accompanying low 
levels of wages in the sector, but their participation in the economy 
of favours gave at least some of them access to a wider range of goods 
as well as money. In these cases, doctors were able to enrich 
themselves beyond their wages. This differed from what the 
economy of favours could provide for ordinary workers, thus 
opening doctors to accusations of bribe taking and illicit gain. 
Because of the risk of such accusations and the threat of legal 
sanctions, doctors protested against depressed employment and 
working conditions mostly at an individual level, either by being 
slack at work or by emigrating rather than by engaging in collective 
action. 
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Citizenship and Informal Relations during  
Post-socialism (1990–2000) 
After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, Romania had a 
centre-left government led by what is known nowadays as the Social 
Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD), and it adopted 
a gradualist approach to the transition to a market economy. This 
was combined with neo-corporatist industrial relations and a weak 
state, which could neither resist labour’s demands nor manage to 
build an institutional configuration favourable to labour (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). The abrupt dismantling of the planned economy 
and the partial liberalization of prices at the beginning of the decade 
prompted massive lay-offs and a sharp fall in real wages. This was 
only partially compensated by the redistribution of cooperative 
lands, the return of former workers to the countryside and the 
reinvigoration of subsistence agriculture (Stan and Erne 2014). 
During the first half of the 1990s, job insecurity and job losses thus 
led to a practical dismantling of worker-citizenship. Facing massive 
social upheaval, post-socialist governments chose, nevertheless, not 
to challenge access to healthcare but instead maintained its role in 
post-socialist citizenship. The organization of healthcare thus 
underwent few significant changes during this period. However, 
decreasing levels of expenditure and wages in the sector led to new 
forms of action on the part of healthcare workers. Both doctors and 
nurses joined free trade unions, although their political leanings and 
forms of protest differed. Federatia Sanitas, the nurses’ union, 
entered into alliances with the ruling Social Democrats, while the 
Romanian Federative Chamber of Doctors Union (Camera 
Federativa a Sindicatelor Medicilor din România, CFSMR) sided with 
right-wing opposition parties. 
With the reinstatement of private property and the dismantling 
of state and cooperative property, the realm of wrongdoing came to 
be redefined in ways that resemble the definition of corruption in 
capitalist societies, as a matter regarding the public sector rather than 
the mass of employees. At the same time, decreasing expenditure 
and wage levels adversely affected the quality of public healthcare, 
and informal exchanges were important for securing good care. It is 
in this context that we have to understand CFSMR’s claim to have 
obtained, by the mid-1990s, the exemption of doctors from 
accusations of luare de mita˘  (bribe taking) (CFSMR 2011). Indeed, 
even though most doctors continued to be public employees in the 
1990s, a legislative document deemed doctors to be not public 
servants but liberal professionals (PR 1995). However, the status of 
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doctors employed in public healthcare units remained ambiguous. 
Not only were various legislative documents subject to different 
interpretations by different judges, the label ‘liberal professional’ 
hardly fitted the fact that so many doctors were public service 
employees. The fact that doctors were not charged with luare de 
mita in the 1990s is probably due more to the government’s 
willingness to turn a blind eye to informal exchanges in the 
healthcare sector than it is to the relabelling of doctors working in 
public healthcare units as liberal professionals. 
During this same period, the growing availability of consumer 
goods led to an increasing use of money in informal exchanges, along 
with the continued use of goods and services. Poorer patients and 
doctors at the bottom of the medical hierarchy lacked the money 
that would buy the post-socialist consumerist abundance; therefore, 
patients often offered goods as spaga; for instance, imported coffee or 
whiskey, but also things like eggs or cheese produced by subsistence 
farmers. Better-off patients and doctors at the top of the medical 
hierarchy increasingly came to exchange money, even if consumer 
goods complemented it in the form of gifts of gratitude. Thus, the 
atentii (attentions) that those patients gave to doctors were more and 
more talked about as spaga – informal prestations of considerable 
value, whether as money or as luxury goods (Stan 2007). 
After the victory of the right-wing coalition Romanian Democratic 
Convention (Convent,ia Democrata˘ Româna˘, CDR) in the election 
at the end of 1996, Romania accelerated the privatization of state 
companies and the liberalization of the economy. This led to a new 
round of inflation, rising unemployment and falling wages, as well as 
increased labour protest. By the end of the 1990s, worker-citizenship 
was in tatters, with real wage levels only 60 per cent of what they had 
been in 1989 and job security surviving only in the public services 
(Stan and Erne 2016). To replace that citizenship, the CDR 
government proposed a post-socialist citizenship predicated on 
fostering entrepreneurial skills in the capitalist market, which was 
expanding because of privatization. 
This post-socialist entrepreneurial citizenship rested on the 
retrenchment of public services and the questioning of universal 
entitlement to them. Thus, the 1997 law on social health insurance 
(PR 1997) changed the funding of Romanian public healthcare 
services from the state budget to a National Health Fund (NHF), 
which collected contributions from both employers and employees. 
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Entitlement to public healthcare services came, then, to be based 
on employment, which in turn depended on an increasingly 
compressed labour market. The 1997 law also turned patients into 
consumers, as it gave those seeking healthcare the freedom to 
choose among doctors and healthcare units, and it introduced 
contractual relationships between the NHF (as purchaser) and 
healthcare providers. 
Because it was adopted in a period of social upheaval, the 1997 
law was not as thoroughgoing as it might have been. In particular, 
it included among those deemed to be insured, and thus eligible for 
healthcare covered by the NHF, some who were not, in fact, 
contributing employees. These included those up to twenty-six 
years of age if not in employment, the spouses, parents and 
grandparents of contributing insured persons and members of 
families receiving social benefits (PR 1997). Nevertheless, some 
people had no access to insured services and had to pay for 
healthcare themselves.1 These included, for example, the long-term 
unemployed who had ceased to receive unemployment benefits, 
those living in areas lacking providers of primary healthcare 
services, those working in the informal economy and those engaged 
in subsistence agriculture (Bara, van den Heuvel and Maarse 2002: 
21).2 
 
Informal Exchanges and Citizenship during the 
Economic Boom (2000–08) 
After its victory in the 2000 elections, the PSD government 
committed itself more firmly to the process of European accession 
and managed to turn Romania away from the 1990s development 
model that combined crumbling socialist industries and 
subsistence agriculture. In its place, it opted to consolidate the turn 
to peripheral neoliberal development (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) 
began by CDR. That involved encouraging foreign firms to set up 
businesses that employed low-skilled, low-paid workers, reducing 
the welfare state still further and facilitating the construction of 
housing, paid for with household debt (Stan and Erne 2014). This 
was coupled with the maintenance of the neo-corporatist industrial 
relations of the 1990s, which insured steady but modest wage 
increases during the boom years of 2000–08. 
The result was a turn from internal urban–rural migration to 
temporary out-migration, mainly to other European countries 
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(Sandu 2005). That migration became an important exit strategy for 
Romania’s disenfranchised working class, as well as an important 
source of funds for Romania’s new development model. Remittances 
also fed into the public services informal exchanges, as they meant 
that households with migrant members were likely to have the 
resources needed to engage in spaga and so gain access to better 
education and healthcare services. 
The consolidation of the neoliberal turn in Romania’s 
development model also led to healthcare being, at last, gradually but 
steadily transformed along the same lines. At the beginning of the 
2000s, doctors practising in primary and secondary care ceased to be 
public employees and instead became free professionals, and more 
and more of them set up their own private, entrepreneurial practices. 
By 2007, 45 per cent of general-practice and family-medicine 
surgeries, and 92 per cent of polyclinics, were private (INS 2013: 
258). Overall, by 2008 19 per cent of all healthcare employees were in 
the private sector (my calculations based on INS 2016). In contrast 
to the situation in primary and secondary care, even at the end of 
2000s most doctors in tertiary healthcare were employed in public 
hospitals. 
The 2004 elections brought to power a right-wing coalition 
government and a right-wing president, Traian Ba˘sescu. This 
inaugurated the ‘Ba˘sescu era’ of 2004–14 (Poenaru and Rogozan 
2014), which saw the extension of neoliberal reform. In their first 
year in power, the new government adopted a personal and corporate 
flat tax set at 16 per cent, which benefited business and the new 
‘comprador bourgeoisie’ (Sampson 2002) that became politically 
powerful. This tax reform was also a blow to public services and to 
the marginalized classes dependent on the social wage provided by 
these services, for underfunding now became structural. 
The new government radically changed both the healthcare sector 
and people’s access to it. Concerning the sector, the 2006 law on 
healthcare reform (PR 2006) said that private healthcare providers 
could contract services with the NHF, which pitted state service units 
against private ones (MS 2013). Another 2006 law allowed public 
healthcare units to ‘externalize medical and non-medical services’ 
(MS 2006; all translations from the Romanian are by the author), so 
that hospitals and other units could contract them out. Concerning 
access, the government further reduced citizens’ entitlement to public 
services and social benefits, now increasingly vilified as Communist 
era dependency on the state (Goina 2012). Thus, the 2006 law that 
allowed private providers to contract with the NHF stipulated that 
those insured with the NHF should have access to a defined ‘basic 
package of services’, while non-insured citizens should have access 
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to only a ‘minimal package of services’: emergency services and 
treatment for contagious diseases (PR 2006). As well, it reduced the 
number of categories of people considered to be insured but exempt 
from paying into the Fund. 
These changes meant that ‘the right to healthcare services provided 
by state healthcare units’ contained in Romania’s constitution (CR 
2003: Art. 47) referred to a shrinking pool of public healthcare 
services (Vladescu and Astarastoae 2012). Also, they led to the 
uneven distribution of healthcare services across the country. In 
contrast to large cities, many deindustrialized small towns and 
rural areas became healthcare deserts. Together with the decline of 
public transport, the shortage of medical personnel meant the 
greater isolation of an increasingly ageing population.3 A 2007 study 
of healthcare in the relatively rich north-west development region 
found that 16 per cent of the active population were not covered by 
national health insurance and almost 4 per cent were not registered 
with a GP (Rat 2008: 20). By contrast, the rising comprador 
bourgeoisie, fuelled by Romania’s new development model, 
increasingly resorted to a strategy of ‘lift-off’ (Sampson 2002) from 
public services into private healthcare, either in Romania or abroad. 
The increasingly unequal access to healthcare was compounded by 
the differences in people’s ability to make informal payments to get 
better care (Stan 2012). The same 2007 study found that 46 per cent 
of respondents who had been hospitalized or had had a close family 
member hospitalized during the previous twelve months had offered 
money to doctors or nurses in order to receive better care (Rat 2008: 
23–24). However, recourse to informal payments differed by class: 59 
per cent of respondents in the richest quintile said that they had made 
such payments, but only 37 per cent of those in the poorest quintile 
had done so (ibid.: 24). Poorer patients still engaged in informal 
exchanges, but complemented their limited cash with goods that they 
had produced themselves or had obtained through other informal 
exchanges. As well, they tried to invoke notions of social justice by 
insisting that the value of informal prestations should be a function 
of a patient’s capacity to give, and that doctors should expect little or 
nothing from those who were less well off (Stan 2007). 
 
Austerity, Healthcare Reforms and Informal Exchanges 
After the onset of the financial crisis and a year after being returned to 
power in 2008, the government signed agreements with the EU and 
the IMF, which led to drastic austerity reforms. More specifically, in 
2010 the government cut wages in the public sector by 25 per cent 
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and restricted the filling of positions that became vacant. The neo- 
corporatist social partnership model was thrown out with the 
adoption of a new Labour Code, which considerably restricted 
collective bargaining rights and trade union membership (Trif 
2013). 
These developments resulted in a deterioration of wage levels and 
working conditions in the healthcare sector, despite considerable 
labour militancy on the part of healthcare unions, particularly Sanitas 
and its umbrella confederation Fratia (Stan and Erne 2016). The 
government took the opportunity of austerity to try to increase state 
withdrawal from, and privatization of, healthcare. They proposed to 
get private insurers to manage the NHF, as outlined in the 2011 law 
on healthcare reform, to close local hospitals, to introduce co-
payment for admission to public hospitals, to use private beds in 
public hospitals as a means of supplementing doctors’ income, to turn 
public hospitals into associations and foundations, to realize the 
ambulatory turn in financing healthcare services (described below) 
and to introduce financial discipline in public hospitals. Following 
union and popular protest, the Ministry of Health temporarily 
abandoned or diluted these proposed reforms. Most notably, 
popular street protests in January 2012, in reaction to the 2011 law, 
led to the law’s suspension, as well as to two government reshuffles 
and, at the end of 2012, the election of a PSD government. In 2013 a 
series of protests conducted by a coalition of trade unions and 
professional organizations led to a new collective agreement in the 
healthcare sector, an increase in wages for resident doctors and the 
opening of new positions, as well as the temporary dropping of the 
idea of turning public hospitals into associations and foundations 
(Stan 2015). 
In spite of the protests, the privatization of the Romanian 
healthcare sector continued, and the austerity period saw a surge 
in the number of private hospitals. By 2012, 23 per cent of the 473 
hospitals in the country were private (INS 2013), and the proportion 
of those in the sector working in private units rose accordingly. 
The result of the austerity reforms was that the previous 
combination of low wages, secure employment and tolerated 
informal exchanges in the sector was replaced by sharply lower 
wage levels and increasingly flexible employment in both public 
and private healthcare. As we will see later, this was to be 
complemented by increasing government intolerance of informal 
exchanges in the healthcare sector. 
By the beginning of the 2010s, as subsistence agriculture started to 
lose its importance as a buffer against unemployment, out-migration 
became one of the acknowledged components of the entrepreneurial 
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citizenship offered by the regime, with Ba˘sescu publicly thanking 
migrants for not being a burden on Romania’s unemployment fund 
(Daily Mail 2012). This citizenship was also increasingly divisive, as 
marginalized classes were vilified as scroungers living off the public 
resources produced through the efforts of honest entrepreneurs, and 
as ungratefully voting for the PSD candidate in the 2014 presidential 
elections (Poenaru 2014). This was manifest in healthcare, as more 
and more in the public arena advocated abolishing the remaining 
categories of people who were treated as insured, even though they 
were exempt from paying contributions (Vladescu and Astarastoae 
2012). If they were to be treated as insured, they should pay. 
Moreover, during the 2010s the spread of private clinics and 
hospitals introduced additional inequalities of access to healthcare. 
Better-off patients could use the private sector, as they would be able 
to afford the co-payments needed to supplement the costs covered 
by the NHF (MS 2013). However, in 2013 the Ministry of Health 
estimated that only 20 per cent of the population could afford the 
necessary co-payments (ibid.), which is not surprising in view of the 
fact that, at the beginning of 2010s, 42 per cent of the population was 
at risk of poverty and social exclusion (MS 2014). 
Finally, inequalities also rose in accessing public healthcare. These 
inequalities were fuelled by the rising importance of money in spaga 
that now took an additionally nasty turn. Indeed, the deterioration 
in wage levels in public hospitals led to a rise in predatory informal 
exchanges whereby some healthcare personnel, most notably doctors 
(Stan 2012), engaged in what in local parlance is called ‘the 
conditioning of the medical act’ on receiving sums of money, which 
for poorer patients were often prohibitive. 
 
Informal Exchanges and the Fuzzy Border between 
Private and Public Healthcare 
It is in this context that spaga entered as a powerful signifier in 
debates around healthcare reforms. Thus, the two authors of the 2011 
healthcare reform law (Vladescu and Astarastoae 2012) said that the 
introduction of regulated competition among private insurers was 
a means to eradicate spaga in public hospitals. Those authors and, 
subsequently, the Ministry of Health (MS 2013), made the same case 
for the ambulatory turn mentioned above; that referred to shifting 
many of those with chronic conditions from hospitals to outpatient 
care, and because outpatient services were primarily private, it would 
effectively privatize a substantial amount of healthcare. In addition, 
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the authors of the 2011 law argued that eliminating spaga would 
eliminate inequalities of access to healthcare services (Vladescu and 
Astarastoae 2012), thus blaming those inequalities on spaga, rather 
than on the neoliberal healthcare reforms and the depletion of public 
health services. 
The existence of spaga in the healthcare services in the 2010s does 
not indicate that greater privatization would eradicate informal 
exchanges. Especially in rural areas and small towns, spaga persisted 
in both primary and secondary healthcare, in both the public and 
the private sector, that catered to the poorer population of these 
areas. Indeed, being usually small entrepreneurial practices, private 
practices in these areas rarely had patients who could afford out-of- 
pocket costs for treatment, and instead contracted a lot of services 
with the NHF. As well, doctors would refer patients who needed 
specialist consultations and treatments to services that also were 
contracted out with the Fund. The overall effect was that spaga 
served to ensure not only better care, but also that patients’ 
consultations would be reimbursed through the NHF rather than 
leaving them out-of-pocket. 
The other area where we find spaga is public hospitals. Following 
measures allowing them to charge patients for services not found 
in the basic NHF package, public hospitals also came to resemble 
small-scale entrepreneurial practices in their combination of services 
covered by the NHF (and thus, in principle, free at the point of 
delivery for insured patients) and those covered by out-of-pocket 
payments. Here we find the same functions of spaga: to ensure better 
care, to have medical consultations reimbursed by the NHF rather 
than being paid out-of-pocket, and to have doctors refer patients to 
other specialist services that are also contracted out with the Fund. 
An additional manipulation of the fuzzy border between private 
and public care is found in situations where doctors working both 
in public hospitals and private clinics shuffled patients between the 
two in a bid to increase their income on the back of public funding. 
Thus, these doctors could refer patients they first see in their private 
practice to the public hospital, thereby transferring some of the costs 
related to treatment to the public system (where they could also 
pocket spaga for their interventions). In the other direction, the same 
doctors could refer their patients from the public hospital to their 
private practice, where they could sometimes cover part of the costs 
through the NHF and also charge patients co-payments (MS 2013). 
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The only area where spaga is not known to be widespread, despite 
occasional claims to the contrary, is in the big private medical centres 
and hospitals – what I call corporate healthcare. In these, corporate 
control seeks to make sure that resources flow into the company’s 
pockets, not those of the staff, and spaga is effectively forbidden, even 
in cases where patients are willing to give it. However, some of the 
doctors working in private corporate care also work in public 
hospitals and, as I described, could engage in shuffling patients 
between the two systems and, in the process, draw on spaga. 
Thus, the forms taken nowadays by spaga are closely related to 
the manner in which the Romanian healthcare system has been 
reshaped over the past few decades, most notably in terms of the 
specific mixes of public and private provision and funding seen 
above. This means that, while already present during socialist times, 
current spaga practices could only very partially be considered as a 
‘legacy of socialism’. Instead they should be seen as also including 
important elements of ‘innovation’ that triggered the neoliberal 
transformation of the Romanian healthcare sector. 
 
Protest and the Criminalization of Informal Exchange 
in Austerity Times 
There is more to spaga than simply a question of how its forms reflect 
neoliberal healthcare reforms. Indeed, the ways in which spaga has 
been used in media debates and some state actors’ interventions in 
the healthcare sector speak to us also of struggles around healthcare 
reforms and of spaga’s role in attempts to contain union and popular 
protest. 
A case in point concerns what has been seen by many union leaders 
as the political use of corruption accusations in order to discipline the 
labour movement and its leaders. In 2010, new laws on corruption 
and the integrity of those engaged in ‘public functions and dignities’ 
identified union leaders among those so engaged. One year later, the 
National Agency for Integrity (Agentia Nationala de Integritate, 
ANI) undertook to verify the wealth of fifteen union leaders 
(Adevarul 2011). Union leaders saw this as a government attack on 
the labour movement, meant to discredit the union leaders who were 
active in the 2010 street protests organized by Romania’s main union 
confederations. A trade union leader described the ANI’s action 
against union leaders as ‘a follow-up of last year’s protests. All [union 
leaders] on the list have been very active in trade union actions’ (ibid.). 
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Also in 2011, the National Anti-corruption Directorate (Directia 
Nationala Anticoruptie, DNA) staged a flagrant (sting operation) that 
caught Marius Petcu, the leader of both the Sanitas union federation 
and the Fratia union confederation, taking bribes from a private 
businessman for the building of a new training centre for Sanitas 
(ARC 2011). Petcu was arrested for corruption, convicted and 
sentenced to seven years in prison. Petcu’s daughter, as well as 
other insiders and sympathizers of Sanitas, claim that his 
prosecution was politically motivated, as his arrest took place ‘only 
eight days after the demonstration where Marius Petcu announced a 
general strike in the healthcare sector’ (Petcu 2013). 
Austerity also saw the intensified use of claims that healthcare 
employees, and especially doctors working in public hospitals, were 
profiting from untaxed informal payments to counter the assertion 
that wages in the sector were too low (Stoica 2012). Many doctors 
saw these claims as a media campaign against the medical profession. 
As one commentator put it, ‘in the case of doctors, demonizing them 
has become a national sport’ (Ene Dogioiu 2013a). For another 
commentator, ‘the medical profession is widely seen as corrupt’, and 
‘the venal doctor . . . has become a fixture of sting operations by 
tabloid papers and the TV news’ (Stancu 2014). The Romanian 
media has become concentrated in the hands of a few powerful 
people with close links to the country’s main political parties, and 
many doctors saw the media corruption stories as a sign of the links 
between media owners and a government seeking to discredit 
doctors’ claims for better wages and working conditions. 
This view was not entirely unwarranted. Since 2009, several 
stings in which doctors working in public hospitals were caught 
receiving and even asking for spaga have been conducted by the 
DNA and have appeared prominently in newspapers and on 
television. More importantly, the DNA’s efforts to include doctors 
working in public hospitals in its anti-corruption campaign 
ultimately led the agency to request a clarification of their legal 
status. At the end of 2014, the High Court of Appeal and Justice 
responded by stating that doctors working in public hospitals are 
civil servants and are thus forbidden to accept ‘supplementary 
payments and donations’ from patients (Hotnews 2015). For the 
first time, therefore, doctors working in public hospitals were 
clearly identified as being subject to laws against luare de mita˘. 
In parallel with the DNA’s efforts, right-wing commentators in 
the media blamed the ills of the healthcare sector on those in it, 
rather than on government policies toward it. One of the most vocal, 
President Ba˘sescu, said that the problems arise not only because of 
informal payments, but also because of mafia-like structures 
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connected to various political interests – by which he apparently 
meant those opposed to his government and its austerity policies. In a 
speech in August 2010, Ba˘sescu said that he knew of doctors who 
were 35 or 40 years old who were leaving the country, not because 
they cannot succeed on a material level, but ‘because of stifling 
structures that do not permit new doctors to progress in their career’ 
(Agerpress 2010). Other right-wing commentators echoed this, 
saying that doctors were leaving the country ‘because here their 
chances of professional development are blocked by the clans that 
took control over most of the hospitals’ (Ene Dogioiu 2013a). That 
same commentator referred to ‘those who for the last twenty-three 
years [i.e. since 1989] have kept the Romanian healthcare system on 
the breakdown line, have humiliated doctors, humiliated patients, 
and drained the healthcare money into private pockets, 
transforming the system into a feud of all sorts of mafias’ (Ene 
Dogioiu 2013c). A former president of the NHF, and member of 
Ba˘sescu’s party, declared at the end of 2013 that ‘the interests in the 
healthcare system and in education are enormous because they 
produce enormous benefits for “health barons” [baronetul sa˘ na˘ ta˘ t,ii]. 
For this reason it is difficult to change anything’ (quoted in Ene 
Dogioiu 2013b). 
These allegations of significant corruption resonate with the 
populist discourse of President Ba˘sescu, who presented himself as a 
modern crusader against corruption and the ‘wretched system’ 
(sistemul tica˘ los,it), and who, like the national hero Vlad the Impaler, 
impales corrupt politicians (Leca 2012). More interestingly, Ba˘sescu 
claimed that the 2012 protests against the 2011 law were the work 
of ‘the mafia system [sistemul mafiot] in healthcare’ (Fierbinteanu 
2014). In his view, then, opposition to the further privatization of the 
sector sprang from the desire to continue to receive gifts and bribes. 
Following this logic, Ba˘sescu later on implicitly acknowledged his 
government’s attempts to make spaga illegal, and presented them as a 
legitimate response to protesters’ refusal to acquiesce to the reform 
law of 2011: ‘I have a lot of respect for doctors, but I assure them that 
if they had not rejected so vehemently the healthcare law proposed in 
January 2012, they would have earned as much as they earn now in 
the context where they have the risk of prosecution’ (ibid.). 
It is not clear if the protests of January 2012 against the 2011 law 
had the potential to sustain an alternative view of the problems that 
Romania’s healthcare system confronts. Doctors were not 
prominent in the protests, which were dominated by the remnants 
of the old socialist classes (workers, intellectuals and pensioners) 
and the newly disenfranchised middle classes of post-socialist 
neoliberal times (Stoica 2012). The demands of these two groups 
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reflected their different positions in Romanian society as well as 
their different views of citizenship. Many of the middle-class 
protesters were among the better-off patients who had already lifted 
off from public health services and would have agreed on the 
president’s view that the latter’s problems lay in the informal 
exchanges between doctors and patients. While agreeing on that 
point with the president, the middle classes, represented by various 
NGOs, were moved to protest mainly because of what they saw as 
the undemocratic behaviour of Romanian politicians (Gotiu 2012). 
They wanted Ba˘sescu and his PDL government to step down, and 
many condemned the political class as a whole. Protesters from the 
old socialist classes wanted this and more. Many of them were 
among the poorer category of patients who understood informal 
exchanges not so much as the justification for the privatization of an 
inherently corrupt public healthcare sector, but as a means to fairer 
access to services. For them, the problem of the Romanian 
healthcare sector lay in the retrenchment of state involvement in 
the sector, as they held that the previous twenty years had seen the 
abusive and illegitimate appropriation of state assets by the new 
ruling elite who were plundering the country. Thus they also 
demanded job creation and decent wages, the end of healthcare 
privatization, increased funds for education and healthcare, and the 
return of the control of the country to its ordinary citizens. 
The alliance of these two segments of the country was too fragile 
to survive. In autumn 2013 there were two important protests in 
Bucharest that met neither physically nor symbolically: against the 
Rosia Montana gold mining and the Pungesti Chevron fracking 
projects, and against employment and working conditions in the 
healthcare sector. Between them, they managed to reduce the 
anticipated degradation of the environment and of employment and 
working conditions in healthcare, but they produced no united front 




This chapter has described the evolving links among citizenship, 
government policies and the configuration of informal exchanges 
in the Romanian healthcare sector. That description shows that 
post-socialist informal exchanges in healthcare are not so much a 
legacy of socialism (see also Zerilli 2013) or an invariant and intrinsic 
characteristic of the state and its public services as a function of the 
evolving reconfigurations of citizenship and the struggles that social 
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actors wage around it. Indeed, these reconfigurations were driven in 
part by the desire to commodify healthcare work and to privatize 
access to healthcare services, and they have been resisted by sections 
of the public and those in the sector. That resistance reflected ideas 
about what citizenship and work in the sector should entail, and also 
ideas about whether or not informal exchange should be a criminal 
offence. Echoing points made in this volume’s Introduction, what I 
have described for Romania shows that the nature of, and reaction to, 
informal exchange in the healthcare sector reflect both economic and 
political forces at work in the country. 
Informal exchange in Romania’s public service resembles what is 
described in Eastern Europe (Stepurko et al. 2015) and even Southern 
Europe (Mossialos, Allin and Davaki 2005). One might, then, be 
tempted to treat what I have described as characteristic of areas that 
are peripheral to global capitalism. However, the link between that 
informal exchange and the mixture of private and public realms that 
is a recurring feature of neoliberal reforms suggests that the 
periphery of global capitalism that is pertinent is not the 
geographical one of regions like Eastern and Southern Europe. 
Rather, it may be the political-economic one of the border between 
the public and the private – a border that neoliberal reform has 
made evermore fuzzy, even in the heartland of global capitalism. 
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1. In 2004, 34 per cent of Romania’s total healthcare expenditure was from 
private sources (Vladescu, Scintee and Olsavszky 2008: 45), which at that 
time was mainly patients making out-of-pocket payments. 
2. The 1997 law allowed self-employed persons and farmers to avail 
themselves of the national health insurance, given that they pay their 
contribution. However, because of their very low income levels, few of 
them did so. At the end of the 1990s, subsistence agriculture rose to 
around 40 per cent of total employment (Stan and Erne 2014: 29). 
3. In 2012, access to NHF services covered 94 per cent of the population in 
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